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Calderon v. Thompson
118 S. Ct. 1489 (1998)
L Facts
The Supreme Court of the United States made its ruling on fact s summa-
rized as follows: Ginger Fleischli ("Fleischli' carried on a sexual relationship
with David Leitch ("David' in 1981, sharing his Laguna Beach studio. In
August of that year Fleischli moved in with David's ex-wife, Tracey Leitch
("Tracey"), and defendant, Thomas Thompson ("Thompson"), moved in with
David. On September 11, 1981, Fleischli and Tracy encountered Thompson and
David in a restaurant, where Fleischli told Tracey that if left alone with Thomp-
son, she feared he would kill her. The foursome proceeded to a bar, but soon
split up, with Fleischli and Thompson remaining at the bar.'
The couple were joined by a third man, Afshin Kashini ("Kashini"), who
drank with them and smoked hashish with Thompson. At 1:00 a.m. the trio
went to Thompson's apartment. At 2:00 a.m. Fleischli left to buy some soda and
soon after Kashini departed. Kashini returned to retrieve a pack of cigarettes he
had left in the apartment, but was not allowed in by Thompson, who handed him
the cigarettes through the open door. Fleischli was not seen alive again.2
On September 14, 1981, police found the buried body of Fleischli in a field
outside of Laguna Beach, California. Fleischli had been stabbed five times near
the right ear. In addition to the stab wounds, bruising was evident on Fleischli's
ankles, palms and left wrist. Heischli's right wrist had been crushed. At the time
her body was found, Fleischli was wearing a shirt and bra, which had been cut in
front and pulled down to her elbows, and jeans. An autopsy provided no
evidence of vaginal tearing or bruising, but did reveal the presence of semen.
Fleischli's body was wrapped in a blanket, sleeping bag and rope; her head was
further wrapped with two towels, a sheet, her jacket and duct tape.
3
The police found evidence linking Fleischli's body to the Laguna Beach
studio apartment, David Leitch's car and the persons ofDavid Leitch and Thomas
Thompson. This evidence included fibers on the body of Fleischli which matched
those found at the apartment, semen found on the body of the victim matching
the blood type of the defendant, footprints matching shoes worn by David
Leitch, and blood stains on the floor of the Laguna Beach apartment matching
the victim's blood type.'
1. Caldcron v. Thompson, 118 S. Ct. 1489, 1494 (1998).
2. Thoipson, 118 S. Ct. at 1494.
3. Id. at 1495.
4. Id.
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On September 26,1981, Thompson was arrested in Mexico. 5 On November
4, 1983, an Orange County Superior Court jury convicted Thompson of murder
and recommended the death penalty, available under California law by the "special
circumstance" finding that a murder occurred during the commission of a rape.6
The death sentence was affirmed on direct appeal.' Before exhausting his
state habeas options, Thompson filed a federal habeas petition with a principal
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.' The United States District Court for
the Central District of California granted relief as to the rape conviction and
death sentence.' The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court's grant and the United States Supreme Court denied Thompson's petition
for writ of certiorari.'0 In a successive state habeas petition, permitted under
California law,' Thompson alleged new evidence invalidating the rape convic-
tion, claiming consensual sex with Fleischli. The California Supreme Court
denied this petition on July 16, 1997.12
Thereafter, Thompson moved the Ninth Circuit to recall its mandate
denying habeas relief. 3 After advising the full court of the motion, and hearing
no requests for en banc consultation, the three judge panel denied the motion on
behalf of the Ninth Circuit on July 28, 1997." During this process, Thompson
also filed a Rule 60(b) motion, citing new consensual sex evidence he had also
raised in one of his successive state habeas petitions.' 5 The district court denied
Thompson's Rule 60(b) motion on July 25, 1997.16 On July 30,1997, the Ninth
Circuit voted to consider en banc whether to recall the mandate it earlier issued
denying habeas relief and scheduled oral arguments for August 1." Meanwhile,
California had conducted a clemency review, denied clemency, and set an execu-
5. Id.
6. Thompson, 118 S. Ct. at 1495. Virginia law is similar, but not identical to California law
when a murder is accompanied by a rape. Section 18.2-31(5) of the Virginia code states that the
following offense constitutes capital murder: "Itlhe willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of
any person in the commission of, or subsequent to, rape or attempted rape..." VA. CODE. ANN.
§ 18.2-31(5) (Michic Supp. 1998). Virginia law requires a further finding of vileness or future
dangerousness for death sentence eligibility. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(C) (Michic Supp. 1998).
7. Thompson, 118 S. Ct. at 1495.
8. Id. at 1495-96.
9. Id. at 1496.
10. Id
11. Virginia allows only one state habeas petition and the petition must include all of the
petitioner's claims. The habeas petition is to be filed no more than six months after habeas counsel
is appointed. Habeas counsel is to be appointed no more than thirty days after the defendant has
exhausted trial appellate issues.
12. Thompson, 118 S. Ct. at 1496.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1496-97.
15. Id. at 1496.
16. Thompson, 118 S. Ct. at 1496.
17. Id. at 1497.
[Vol. 11 : 1
CALDERON V THOMPSON
don date.' Two days before Thompson was to be executed, the Ninth Circuit
recalled its mandate and granted habeas relief to Thompson, citing en banc proce-
dural difficulties in its internal notification process. 9 The United States Supreme
Court granted California's certiorari petition and later ordered the mandate
denying relief to be reinstated.'
II. Holding
In a five to four ruling, the United States Supreme Court held that a United
States Court of Appeals has an inherent power to recall its mandates, subject only
to review for an abuse of discretion.2' The Supreme Court held that the Ninth
Circuit committed an abuse of discretion when it recalled its mandate denying
federal habeas corpus relief to Thompson. 2 The Court stated that the Ninth
Circuit had not acted to avoid a miscarriage of justice because the record failed
to show actual innocence of the crime or innocence of the death penalty.'
III. Anaysis/Application in Virginia
A. AEDPA 's Bar on Successive or Second Federal Habeas Applications
In evaluating the Rule 60(b) motion containing new evidence allegations, the
United States Supreme Court decided whether the bar on successive federal
habeas petitions found in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
("AEDPA") invalidated the Ninth Circuit's action. Section 2244(b)(1) provides
that "[a] claim presented in a second or subsequent habeas corpus application
under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed."'24
Section 2244(b)(2) provides that "[a] claim presented in a second or successive
application under section 2254 that was not presented in a prior application shall
be dismissed."'
The Court held that a petitioner's motion to recall a mandate should be re-
garded as a second or successive application with respect to 28 U.S.C.A.
2244(b).26 By granting such a motion, a circuit court's action had to conform
18. Id
19. Id at 1497. The court cited two reasons for recalling the earlier mandate: (1) certain
procedural misunderstandings prevented the court from calling en banc review of the underlying
decision before issuing the mandate denying relief, and (2) the decision of the original panel would
lead to a miscarriage of justice. Id
20. Thompson, 118 S. Ct. at 1498.
21. Id When reviewing on the basis of an abuse of discretion, the reviewing court should
afford the lower court the greatest level of deference with regard to the lower court's findings. Id
22. Id at 1506.
23. Id at 1505-06.
24. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) (Supp. 1997). Section 2254 outlines the federal court remedies
for persons seeking habeas relief while in state custody.
25. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) (Supp. 1997).
26. Thompson, 118 S. Ct. at 1500.
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with section 2244(b)(1) if the motion was based on old claims or section
2244(b)(2) if the motion was based on new claims.27 The Supreme Court distin-
guished the position, found in Thompson's case, where the court recalled the
motion on its own initiative. Nevertheless, the Court held that recalling the
mandate could still be barred if "the court consider[ed] new claims or evidence
presented in successive application for habeas relief."2
In Thompson, the United States Supreme Court found that the Ninth Circuit
had been careful to state that its recall action stemmed exclusively from Thomp-
son's first habeas petition, not the new evidence allegations found in his Rule
60(b) motion or motion to recall the mandate. 9 In light of this finding, the
Court held that the Ninth Circuit's recall did not violate the AEDPA provision
barring second or successive habeas corpus applications."
B. The Power to Recall a Mandate and the Propnety of the Ninth Circuit's Action
The United States Supreme Court then held that circuit courts have an
inherent power to recall their mandates, subject only to review on an abuse of
discretion standard.3 However, the Court then stated that a "court abuses its
discretion unless it acts to avoid a miscarriage of justice as defined by our habeas
corpus jurisprudence."32 This holding brought back into consideration the issue
of Thompson's new evidence attacking the rape conviction. This resulted
because the Court's habeas jurisprudence limits "miscarriage of justice" to cases
where a prisoner can demonstrate either innocence of the offense or innocence
(absence of eligibility) of the death penalty.3
The Supreme Court's explanation of its jurisprudence on this issue provides
Virginia attorneys with important information when new evidence is discovered
suggesting innocence with respect to either the capital murder offense or the
sentence of death (death penalty eligibility). The AEDPA text on successive
petitions recognizes only innocence of the offense as an exception to the bar of
second or successive federal habeas corpus petitions.' Section 2244(b)(2)(B)
provides that:
[a] claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application...
that was not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed unless- ....
(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evi-
dence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing
27. Id
28. Id A court's sua sponte action cannot subvert section 2244(b)(2), which bars claims
presented in second or successive habeas applications.
29. Id
30. Thompson, 118 S. Ct. at 1500.
31. Id at 1498.
32. Id at 1501-02.
33. Id at 1502-03.
34. Thompson, 118 S. Ct. at 1502.
[Vol. 11: 1
CALDERON V THOMPSON
evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would
have found the applicant guilty of he underving offnse.35
The innocence of the death penalty exception does not appear in the text of
AEDPA.
Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court recognized both innocence
of the underlying offense and innocence of the death penalty doctrines when it
held Thompson ineligible for relief under his new evidence allegation, finding
that he had not proved either.36 The Court's utilization of both standards is an
important federal habeas corpus jurisprudence development."
C. Future Implications of Calderon v. Thompson
The Supreme Court's miscarriage of justice standard allowing second or
successive habeas applications stems from two cases decided in the '90s. Schlup
v. Delo3 provided the standard required to be met when the prisoner claims inno-
cence of an underlying offense. The petitioner must demonstrate through
reliable evidence that "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would
have convicted him in light of the new evidence."39 Sauyer v. Whitly4 ° set the
standard of proof when the petitioner claims innocence of the death penalty: "'by
clear and convincing evidence' that no reasonable juror would have found [the
petitioner] eligible for the death penalty in light of the new evidence."'"
Ambiguity exists, as the Supreme Court noted, when the new evidence
indicates the defendant's innocence of the death eligibility predicate factor.
4 2
Thompson had been convicted of the offenses of murder and rape and the jury
had also found the rape as a special circumstance, making him eligible for a
sentence of death.43 This circumstance raises both the question of innocence of
35. 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(2) (Supp. 1997)(emphasis added). Congress used language from two
standards found in the Court's jurisprudence when formulating this section of AEDPA. Congress
used the test formulated in Sanyerv. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992), of clear and convincing evidence
for the standard of actual innocence of the underlying offense found in Schiup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298
(1995).
36. Thompson, 118 S. Ct. at 1506. The Court analyzed the second innocence exception
(innocent of the death penalty) as part of a determination of whether the Ninth Circuit abused its
discretion, rather than in the context of a successive habeas petition. As a practical matter, however,
such analysis would be meaningless if the court had concluded that the exception had been
completely eliminated by its omission from AEDPA. Therefore, Virginia lawyers have both
innocence doctrines at their disposal.
37. Id Federal habeas counsel traditionally have greater resources at their disposal than state
habeas counsel. Therefore, it is more likely that counsel at this level will uncover new evidence
suggesting their client's innocence of the offense or innocence of the death penalty.
38. 513 U.S. 298 (1995).
39. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 326-27 (1995).
40. 505 U.S. 333 (1992).
41. Thompson, 118 S. Ct. at 1503 (quoting Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 327, 348 (1992)).
42. Id at 1503.
43. Id at 1495.
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an underlying offense and eligibility for a death sentence. Finding that Thomp-
son's claim failed under both approaches, the Court left open the question of
what standard, the Schlup "more likely than not" or the Sauyer"clear and convinc-
ing," would be appropriate in this case."
While the Supreme Court holding interpreted and dealt with California
capital murder law, Virginia's statutes are similar. In fact, the argument that the
Schlup standard should apply in a situation like Thompson's should be stronger
in Virginia. That is because rape is a component of the "underlying offense" of
capital murder under Virginia law.
Matthew Mahoney
44. Id at 1503.
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